1
Sang Culture (it is not directly related to the current quarantine period, but I find it quite interesting and perhaps relevant to the book)
The main context Halberstam situates her 'failure' in is the neoliberalism positivity in the Euro-American society. Based on my own living experience in China, I found the recent popularity of Sang (sub)culture in East Asia, especially Japan and China, can perhaps provide an alternative lens for Halberstam's sense of failure.
The original meaning of
Sang 丧 includes funeral, misfortune, and loss. In Chinese youth culture, it has become a popular collective identification of a dispirited and despair attitude defeatism in daily life. One of the crucial social contexts is the intensive 9-9-6 office culture, which refers to working from 9am to 9pm, for six days a week. The co-existence of the profound sense of competition, as well as the dimming career future of youth people, has a direct impact on their work ethics and the affective atmosphere circulating in society.
The disruptive narrative of Sang appears in multiple self-loathing cultural practices, such as memes, animation, and music. For instance, (also one of my favorite) the popular Rainbow Chamber Singers' piece has humorously exemplified the 'sang' in the daily office life, including the abusive boss, overtime workload and increasing mental stress.
So far, the sofa is so far (With English subtitles)
The playful, unregulated and self-deprecating practice of
Sang in Chinese cyberspace in a way resonates with Halberstam's idea of failure as a form of resistance. Confronted with the insurmountable hegemony and relentless push of conventional success, passivity/sang becomes a dynamic way as the micro-level of self-defense, preservation, and also protest.
2
Forget and Memory: the narratives of Li Wenliang's death
In Chapter 2, Halberstam talks about the absence of memory becomes an alternative mode of knowing. It immediately reminds me of the death of the whistleblower Li Wenliang, a doctor in Wuhan, who has warned about the outbreak of the epidemic on December 30th, 2019 but has been told to shut his mouth by the authorities.
The
timeline of Li Wenliang's death in media is ironically full of mysteries. At that time, the angry and emotional Chinese netizens showed the commitment of never-forget, “We will not forget the doctor who spoke up about an illness that was called rumor,” one commenter posted in reply to the hospital’s announcement. “What else can we do? The only thing is not to forget.”
On April 4th, the Ching Ming Festival (or the tomb-sweeping festival), "Never Forget" and mourning for the loss becomes a top-down, nationalistic command where the deeds and death of Li become invisible. Halberstam also mentions it as the "moral imperative" that "tends to obliterate the complex web of relations between memory and forgetting that actually function in Holocaust memoirs"(84). What has been instead selectively memorized? What has been forced to forget? Who can decide what and whom should Chinese people commemorate in the coronavirus experience?
Moreover, on April 6th,
the timeline posted by the state media manages to construct a dominant memory project, where Li Wenliang becomes an ordinary medic, leaving out his unjustified treatment and the mystery of his death untold. At the same time, the central government and Health Commission become prominent actors during the prediction, control, and regulation of the disease with all-encompassing 'powerful and effective' measures and 'the strong leadership' of the CPC.
Such memory construction implies a eulogy of achievement, even optimistic plot of progress and continuity, which violently ignores the never-resolved loss and unspoken sorrow of real people.
"Forgetting is also what allows for a new way of remembering" (92). Inspired by the analysis of Halberstam, perhaps a simple gesture of refusal towards such enforced "memory project" and the reproduction of a given timeline open up spaces for fragmented, bottom-up narratives coming from individual sufferers. Though such stories might be irrational, blurred, stupid, full of flaws, it does forcefully undermine the cruelness of hegemonic historizing.
3
The extreme vulnerability of female medics
More than 70% of the medics in China in the frontline of coronavirus period are female, whose superiors in the hospital and government are mostly men.
Chinese state media has propagandized the female medical workers who (have been forced to) shave their heads as “the most beautiful warriors” fighting the outbreak. On the one hand, the medic becomes a gender-neutral identity. Apparently, accompanied by intensive labor, there is no room for the individual, 'unwelcome' voices such as uncertainty, pessimism, rejection, and fear in the patriotic warrior narrative. Yet, on the other hand, the specific need for female are largely excluded and forgotten in the male-centered perspective.
Shaved Heads, Adult Diapers: Life as a Nurse in the Coronavirus Outbreak
The patriarchal violence and governance are flagrantly explicit during the time of coronavirus in China. As a Chinese woman myself, I feel extremely sorrowful and desperate myself sometimes when reading the above news and outcry of women. What I constantly ask myself recently is: what could be the weapon of the Chinese women in the increasingly-rigid hegemonic system?
Halberstam's insight on the failure as a way of life has in a way justified the queering instabilities and impossibilities in the neo-liberalism society. Personally, I strongly agree with her strategy of "working with the failure" when it comes to the Chinese feminist context, where the terrain of fear, miserable and failed is crucial for resisting the optimistic and patriarchal media discourse, especially in the coronavirus time.